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Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) footprints in terms of relevant policies, plans 
and programs are evident at a global scale, but the level of national uptake and 
penetration differs, as countries differ considerably in terms of institutional efficiency. 
With this in mind, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between 
CSR penetration and institutional conditions that shape and define the macroeconomic 
environment and development dynamics of countries. Building on Campbell's seminal 
propositions on institutional parameters that facilitate effective CSR management, the 
study’s results lend partial support to his conceptual framework as it was 
operationalized in our assessment. Civic engagement, regulatory effectiveness and 
competitive conditions appear to be very significant factors influencing CSR 
penetration with macroeconomic conditions and industrial self-regulation to play a 
less significant role on national CSR penetration. These findings provide fertile 
ground to theorists and researchers for a deeper investigation of the impact of 
institutional arrangements that define the national specificity of CSR and act as 
moderators of responsible business behavior.  
 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility (CSR); national institutions; national 
index; cross-country analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Manuscript
Click here to download Manuscript: Halkos_Skouloudis_National CSR & Institutional Conditions_R1_.docClick here to view linked References
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, corporate social responsibility (CSR), as an emerging area of 
study of organizational management has expanded and the umbrella-term of 
responsible business conduct has gained increasing attention at a global scale  under 
the scope of mitigation, stewardship and sustainability concerns (Wood, 2010; Lozano 
2012). Nevertheless, this continuously expanding sub-field of business literature 
pertains mostly to studies focusing at the micro-level and meso-level within certain 
national environments while there is limited research at the macro-level (i.e. national 
and cross-country assessments). Blowfield (2005) stresses that the discourse fostered 
by contemporary CSR necessitates expanded lenses of analysis in which alternative 
frameworks for exploring the structural dimensions of CSR would be crucial. In a 
similar vein, Ringov and Zollo (2007) point out that a solid empirical base to link 
national specificity with CSR is absent with most of the debate to be fueled by either 
conceptual arguments or anecdotal evidence. In this context, critical questions posed 
to policy-makers and scholars respectively are: why firms in some countries are more 
socially responsible than firms in other countries? What are the factors that affect 
CSR across countries? Which institutional parameters facilitate strong CSR 
penetration in a national economy and why the business sector in certain countries 
and regions exhibits comparatively weaker CSR penetration? 
The paper attempts to respond to such pressing questions and contribute to the 
scant literature of institutionally-bound CSR assessment with the guiding research 
question to be the investigation of the impact of national institutions on the 
proliferation of socially responsible behavior. To this end, it builds on the seminal 
work of Campbell (2007) published in the Academy of Management who sets forth a 
series of assertions grounded on institutional theory on why firms engage in socially 
responsible behaviors. Such normative arguments, referring to macroeconomic 
stability, competition, industrial self-regulation, regulatory quality as well as civic 
activism, are empirically examined and operationalized at the national level in the 
present study. Campbell’s framework stresses that the voluntary and proactive 
practices that the CSR construct posits, part of the wider spectrum of activities 
pertaining to the interaction between business and society, are fundamentally 
determined by the institutional terrain within which a firm operates. Campbell’s work 
paved the way for a more comprehensive investigation of comparative CSR trends 
and developments under the nexus of institutional structures and the efficiency of 
national institutional conditions. His framework marked the contested and contingent 
nature of the CSR notion by suggesting that the responsibility of business to society is 
defined by societal demands and expectations as these are embodied in a country’s 
formal and informal institutions. Other theorists have drawn on his work to stress the 
value of institutional lenses in understanding broader socioeconomic, historical and 
political determinants of whether and in what courses of action business entities may 
take on social responsibilities (e.g. Brammer et al. 2012). For instance, Matten and 
Moon (2008) and Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) assert that in countries pertaining 
to the Anglo-Saxon model companies tend to engage more explicitly in voluntary 
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policies, plans and practices of social responsibility whereas in countries with 
coordinated market economies aspects of organizational responsibility are embedded 
and shaped by legal regulation and other formal institutions. In a similar vein, Witt 
and Redding (2012) focus on senior executives from diverse institutional 
environments and provide supporting evidence that highlight country variations in 
CSR conceptualization and the related salience attached to various organizational 
stakeholder groups. Nevertheless, despite Campbell’s paper has received numerous 
citations
1
 and scholars tend to refer to his propositions when developing normative 
arguments on the political economy of CSR, none has attempted to empirically 
examine his propositions as testable hypotheses. 
Motivated by the work of scholars such as the previous and by drawing upon 
Campbell’s framework as the basis of the assessment presented in this paper, we seek 
to contribute to the empirical literature on institutional determinants of CSR. This is 
the first study to offer finding on the role of national institutions on CSR penetration 
which draws on the largest (to date) sample of countries around the world utilizing 
findings on the level of country-level CSR penetration by Skouloudis (2014) and 
Skouloudis et al. (2016). Taking into consideration data availability for various 
institutional conditions as well as the limitations of cross-country CSR assessments, 
the study paves the ground for further empirical investigation of the institutional 
conditions that define CSR proliferation among countries.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines prior literature 
along with Campbell’s theoretical model and propositions. Next, the data and 
methods are described followed by the presentation of results. Finally, the discussion 
of our findings and concluding remarks on opportunities for future research wrap up 
the paper. 
 
2. Background 
The institutional conditions of a country have been pinpointed for their enormous 
influence over organizational decisions or actions. In this regard, the institutional 
environment has been characterized as the ‘rules of the game’ (Thelen, 1999), 
defining business actions and regarded as essential antecedent of the development 
potential of nations by enabling stability and facilitating market efficiency. Findings 
by Globerman and Shapiro (2002) as well as Harms and Ursprung (2002) indicate a 
positive relationship between foreign direct investment inflows (FDIs) and the 
institutional conditions of countries while a negative relationship of FDIs with the 
relative level of national corruption has also been documented (Habib and Zurawicki, 
2002). Nevertheless, as Barley (2007) criticizes, there is an evident ‘lag’ in the 
management literature in attending a broader understanding of the interaction between 
for-profit organizations and their multifaceted institutional environment. 
The long debate on corporate responsibility has placed comparatively more 
emphasis on the relation between social and financial performance (Margolis et al., 
                                                 
1
 According to Google Scholar his paper has been cited by almost 2000 authors. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
4 
 
2007) in an attempt to signify CSR as a missing link in improving the financial 
bottom line and competitiveness (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Vilanova et al., 2009). 
Despite viewed as a global issue endorsed over the years by international 
organizations and through transnational best-practice schemes, CSR penetration has 
exhibited increased variation across regions and countries (Welford 2003; 2005). 
Such variation pertains to the level as well as the focus of corporate involvement 
(Marquis et al., 2007) something which is attributed to discrepancies in the 
institutional efficiency among countries. Yet, CSR scholars have been somewhat slow 
to investigate the effects of institutional conditions on responsible business conduct 
(Aguilera et al., 2007; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). It is only during the mid-
2000s when the conceptual approaches in exploring the CSR construct have expanded 
to include the institutional lens to better understand nonfinancial aspects of corporate 
responsibility (e.g. Aguilera et al., 2007).  
A growing body of literature indicates that corporate responsibility is dependent on 
and embedded in a nexus of institutions that characterize the national identity of each 
country (Khanna et al., 2006). Placing CSR within the wider terrain of institutional 
mechanisms allowed the initiation of a more cross-disciplinary inquiry of responsible 
business conduct through different modes pertaining to political economy, political 
science, corporate law, sociology of organizations, cultural traits, religious norms 
and/or regional traditions as well as the relational pressures that stem from such 
institutional aspects. For instance, research evidence by Baskin (2006) and Jamali et 
al. (2009) echoes supporting arguments on the institutional interplay between state 
policies, private sector discretionary activities and civil society’s activism in shaping 
the CSR penetration among national contexts. Scholars are beginning to identify the 
critical importance of institutions in explaining CSR-specific aspects (Jamali and 
Neville, 2011), such as human resources management (Edelman and Suchman, 1997), 
environmental performance (Bansal and Roth, 2000), nonfinancial accountability 
(Chen and Bouvain, 2009) or community relations (Guthrie and McQuarrie, 2004).  
Still, cross-country comparisons between CSR and national institutional settings 
remain relatively sparse (e.g. Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010), compared to other 
fields business research (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Williams and Aguilera, 
2008). In addressing this gap in the literature, this study draws on aspects of 
Campbell’s framework of institutional conditions and empirically tests them among a 
large pool of countries assessed in terms of CSR penetration. 
 
2.1 Institutional conditions vis-à-vis CSR: Outlining Campbell’s framework 
In his seminal paper, Campbell (2007) builds his argumentation around a central 
question: taking into account the overarching profit-maximization principle and 
opportunistic tendencies of business entities, what conditions facilitate the socially 
responsible conduct of companies or why would a firm operate in socially responsible 
ways? According to his viewpoint, firms that act in a socially responsible manner are 
either not knowingly do anything that could harm their stakeholders or, when they do 
cause such harm, rectify it whenever it is brought to their attention.  
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Acknowledging that responsible corporate behavior varies across countries, 
Campbell draws on the literature of comparative political economy and institutional 
analysis to assert that that the way companies manage stakeholder demands and 
expectations is dependent on the institutions within which they operate. In this 
context, he formulates a set of propositions framing specific institutional conditions 
that affect firms’ propensity to act in socially responsible ways. 
First, Campbell denotes that companies with low profitability possess 
comparatively fewer slack resources to employ towards CSR practices. Even so, such 
is the case for firms experiencing financial losses and exhibit weak financial 
performance. In this context, focusing at the macro-level, he emphasizes the vital 
importance of the macroeconomic climate for CSR endorsement; macroeconomic 
downturn and an ‘unhealthy’ or unstable economic environment can have a direct 
effect on business profitability which in turn influences socially responsible behavior. 
Second, he conceptualizes a curvilinear relationship between CSR and competitive 
conditions. Specifically, in markets where competition is either very intense (i.e. 
‘cutthroat’ competitive conditions) or very low (i.e. in either monopolies or 
monopsonies) companies will disregard CSR engagement and, contrarily, will have 
the inclination to act in socially irresponsible ways. Yet, under normal conditions of 
market competition, companies are very concerned to preserve their public image and 
reputation as well as to safeguard customer loyalty and suppliers’ trust. Thus, in such 
conditions firms are more likely to engage in CSR activities and endorse a socially 
responsible behavior. 
Next, Campbell sets forth the effectiveness of the regulatory framework denoting 
its criticality in facilitating CSR behavior. According to his conception, well-designed 
- in terms of negotiation and consensus-building - as well as properly-enforced laws 
and regulations can mitigate social irresponsibility and effectively monitor and control 
business conduct. In parallel with state regulation, he further points out the need for 
industrial organizations to develop their own behavioral standards and self-regulation 
mechanisms to ensure increased CSR penetration.  
The next element in Campbell’s framework refers to the role of civic engagement 
in terms of stakeholder groups, NGOs and/or advocacy organizations which can act as 
‘watchdogs’ and oversee corporate conduct in order to mobilize businesses to avert 
from alarming practices. By mobilizing media campaigns, drawing public attention, 
organizing demonstrations to exert pressure or appealing directly to firms such 
movements can minimize corporate irresponsibility and potentially contribute to 
incorporating CSR in corporate policies, plans and operations. 
In view of the above the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H1: National CSR penetration is dependent on the macroeconomic conditions of a 
country 
H2: National CSR penetration is dependent on the level of market competition in a 
country 
H3: National CSR penetration is positively associated with the regulatory 
effectiveness of a country. 
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H4: National CSR penetration is positively associated with the level of self-regulation 
characterizing the business sector of a country. 
H5: National CSR penetration is dependent on the level of civic engagement in a 
country 
Campbell goes on to indicate the role of education, trade/employee associations 
along with fruitful stakeholder dialogue in promoting the social responsibility of for-
profit organizations. He concludes his framework analysis by stressing: a) that the 
institutional conditions which set the ‘rules of the game’ for business conduct are not 
static but dynamically shift over time, b) that deregulation alone, in the verge of a 
globalized economy, does not ensure high CSR penetration but robust institutions are 
also necessary and c) that managerial attitudes towards CSR are critical and should be 
accompanied with institutional mechanisms that ensure that firms are actually behave 
in a socially responsible manner.  
 
3. Material and methods 
3.1 Model specifications  
The proposed model specification is of the form: 
 
with y being a (nx1) vector and X an (nxk) matrix; β and ε are (kx1) and (nx1) vectors 
respectively.  
 
3.2. Dependent variable: National CSR penetration 
The dependent variable y is proxied by the national CSR index  (NCSRI) obtained 
from Skouloudis (2014) and Skouloudis et al. (2016) who extend Gjølberg’s (2009) 
approach and utilize country data on subscription, inclusion or participation in sixteen 
international CSR initiatives, environmental and social standards, ‘best-in-class’ 
rankings and ethical investment stock exchange indices2. Each one of these 
‘components’ for national CSR appraisal indicates the number of organizations 
endorsing the specific CSR ‘variable’. Skouloudis selects the year 2012 as the 
reference period for data capture and a ‘cut-off’ value of inclusion in at least four out 
of the sixteen CSR ‘sub-indices’ (i.e. national business sectors with presence in less 
than four components of the NCSRI were removed from the assessment). In this 
respect, 86 out of the 196 countries (Appendices 1 and 2), spanning from all 
geographical regions of the world are ranked in terms of CSR penetration, offering an 
encompassing worldview of the current CSR status. Scholars (e.g. Gjølberg, 2009; 
Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010; have pinpointed such strong differences in CSR 
penetration among countries to differences in comparative institutional advantages 
which define to the observed aggregate variation among assessed national. 
                                                 
2
 These sixteen CSR ‘variables’ comprising the index are the following: ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001, 
SA 8000, Global Reporting Initiative, Carbon Disclosure Project, Greenhouse Gas Protocol, KPMG 
triennial survey on CSR reporting, Global Compact, World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, Ethibel Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good Global Index, Dow Jones Sustainability 
World Enlarged Index, ECPI Global ESG Alpha Equity Index, MSCI World ESG Index, World’s Most 
Ethical companies, Global 100 Most Sustainable Corporations. 
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The ranking indicates considerable CSR penetration among only 12 countries. It is 
only two of those which pertain to the Asia and Pacific region (Australia and 
Singapore) while the rest are European countries. Switzerland, which is often 
considered a world hub of trading and a country where a large number of 
multinational groups are headquartered and/or operating, topped the ranking and is 
followed by three Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark). Japan and 
Canada receive an approximately zero score, indicating “perfect proportionality 
between ‘CSR companies’ relative to the size of the economy” (Gjølberg, 2010: 15). 
In this respect, Fukukawa and Moon (2004) denote the increased exposure of Japan’s 
business sector to global capital markets, the adoption of Western management 
techniques as well as governmental initiatives as critical factors of CSR proliferation 
in the country. Germany is assigned a negative score, with Jackson and Apostolakou 
(2010) to indicate that the country is often characterized a ‘CSR laggard’ compared to 
other Western European countries and that domestic firms have retained a highly 
ambivalent stance towards CSR initiatives while the favorable domestic economic 
climate relative and high level of social integration have contributed to slow public 
demand for CSR in the country. Emerging economies and those of developing nations 
received much lower scores which warrant further attention and offer fertile ground 
for deeper investigation (as are the cases of developed nations such as Portugal, 
Belgium and Spain).  
 
3.3 Independent variables 
X is the matrix including the explanatory variables of interest. Specifically, five 
factors are considered, referring to distinct institutional conditions characterizing a 
national environment, in line with Campbell’s conceptual framework. 
Macroeconomic conditions (MACRO) is expressed in the model specifications 
presented below by a) the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) third pillar of the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) referring to the macroeconomic environment (Model 1), 
and b) by a composite factor consisting of five figures referring to macroeconomic 
stability: inflation rate (%), public debt to GDP (%), budget surplus or deficit (as % of 
GDP), current account balance (% of GDP) and the national unemployment rate (%) 
(Models 2 and 3).  
Competitive conditions (COMP) are expressed by the WEF’s sixth pillar of the 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) referring to domestic and foreign competition. 
Regulatory effectiveness (REG) is expressed by the following five indices 
encapsulating the robustness and quality of the national regulatory framework: i) The 
Ease of Doing Business index, ii) the Corruption Perception index, iii) pillar 1A of 
WEF’s GCI referring to public institutions along with iv) the Government 
Effectiveness and v) the Regulatory Quality indices of World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). 
Industrial self-regulation (INDUSTR) is proxied with the following WEFs GCI 
sub-indices pertaining to privately-established institutional arrangements: i) strength 
of auditing and reporting standards, ii) efficacy of corporate boards, iii) protection of 
minority shareholders’ interests and iv) strength of investor protection. 
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Civic engagement (CIV) is expressed interchangeably in our model specifications 
presented below by a) the Civil Liberties sub-index of Freedom House’s 'Freedom in 
the World' index (Model 2), and b) the ‘Civic Activism’ index of the International 
Institute of Social Studies (ISS) (Model 3).  
To explore the extent to which country-level socioeconomic conditions moderate 
the relationship between institutions and CSR penetration, we controlled for human 
development, by employing the HDI index, and for income distribution through the 
GINI coefficient.  
In this context, the following function was estimated: 
 
NCSRI = f (MACRO, COMP, REG, INDUSTR, CIV, HDI, GINI) 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables considered while 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results – using three models with different 
variables – are reported in Table 2. In all three models there is no problem of 
normality.  
In Model 1 only the explanatory variables are included; namely the statistical 
significant variables are those of macroeconomic environment (expressed by WEF’s 
GCI pillar 3), competitive conditions, public institutions, the corruption perception 
index and government effectiveness. Facing increased heteroscedasticity we employed 
factor analysis and grouped variables in an attempt to cope with the issue. We devised 
three the factors, namely macroeconomic stability (consisting of the five 
macroeconomic figures indicated in section 3.3), regulatory effectiveness (derived 
from the five indices mentioned in section 3.3 which encapsulate the robustness and 
quality of the national regulatory framework) and industrial self- regulation (by 
utilizing WEFs GCI sub-indices pertaining to privately-established institutional 
arrangements).  
In this way, Model 2 includes these three factors along with civic engagement 
expressed by the Freedom House’s civil liberties proxy. Model 2, although better 
compared to Model 1, still faced problems of heteroscedasticity.  
Model 3 first included all three factors and civic engagement expressed by the 
ISS’s civic activism proxy and then was run with the same specification and the 
addition of the control variables (HDI and GINI). The control variable HDI was found 
to be statistically insignificant with a value of P=0.143. Likewise, GINI presented P-
values even higher and equal to 0.7 and it was omitted. Model 3 is better compared to 
Models 2 and 3 with no issues of heteroscedasticity.  
The parameter estimates in the proposed regressions reveal that all model 
formulations have as explanatory variables the proxies pertaining to the 
macroeconomic conditions in the level of 5% in Model 1 (macroeconomic 
environment) and in the 10% significance level in Models 2 and 3 (macroeconomic 
stability factor). Regulatory effectiveness is statistically significant in all statistical 
levels; the variable industrial self-regulation is significant in all levels in Model 2 and 
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in the level of 5% in Model 3. Still the proxies of these institutional conditions are 
correlated with the dependent variable with very low magnitudes. Civic engagement, 
expressed by civil liberties in Model 2 and civic activism in the other two 
specifications of Model 3, are statistically significant in all levels of significance. 
Civil liberties and HDI are negatively correlated with NCSRI. The variable of civic 
activism presents very high magnitudes and a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable. Comparing the last two model specifications it is evident that Model 3 by 
employing the civic activism variable performs quite well with no indication of 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables considered 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Obs 
NCSRI -18.32320 -24.21512 14.43203 -37.06495 20.64357 86 
MACRO -0.046512 -5380.500 99999.95 -326424.0 498723.0 86 
REG -0.023256 -34013.50 100000.0 -50511.00 723436.0 86 
INDUSTR 0.012195 5912.000 99999.98 -267023.0 167964.0 82 
COMP 4.5696 4.567 0.5936 2.6270 5.8901 84 
CIVACT 0.538682 0.524000 0.053540 0.423000 0.679000 85 
CIVLIB 2.732558 2.000000 1.745073 1.000000 7.000000 86 
GINI 37.59500 36.50000 9.351476 23.00000 63.10000 80 
HDI 0.786129 0.806000 0.103517 0.500000 0.943000 85 
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Table 2:  OLS model results and diagnostics tests (P-Values in brackets). 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  
-10.7278 
[0.0000] 
-119.17 
[0.0000] 
-110.53 
[0.0000] 
Macroeconomic 
conditions 
Macroeconomic 
environment 
-2.8608 
[0.0195] 
   
Macroeconomic 
stability 
 
0.000014 
[0.0983] 
0.00001 
[0.0945] 
0.0000097 
[0.0979] 
Competitive conditions 
-11.4954 
[0.0000] 
   
Regulatory effectiveness  
0.00008 
[0.0000] 
0.000034 
[0.0000] 
0.000047 
[0.0032] 
Industrial self-regulation  
0.000034 
[0.0019] 
0.000021 
[0.0161] 
0.0000203 
[0.0168] 
Civic 
engagement 
Civil liberties  
-2.7138 
[0.0000] 
 
 
Civic activism  
 187.63 
[0.0000] 
204.583 
[0.0000] 
Corruption Perception Index 
-0.1381 
[0.0131] 
   
Public Institutions 
5.5402 
[0.0271] 
   
Government Effectiveness 
0.49524 
[0.0000] 
   
HDI  
 
 
 
-22.383 
[0.1429] 
R
 
square 0.58 0.62 0.76 0.772 
Normality test (Jarque-Bera) 
0.16796 
[0.9194] 
0.6513 
[0.7221] 
1.3645 
[0.5055] 
2.6459 
[0.2664] 
Heteroscedasticity test  
(Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey) 
4,2473 
[0.0018] 
5.2363 
[0.0009] 
1.5296 
[0.2021] 
1.3232 
[0.2637] 
Heteroscedasticity test (Harvey) 
2.2622 
0.0563] 
1.3549 
[0.2575] 
1.4982 
[0.2112] 
7.6859 
[0.1744] 
Heteroscedasticity test (Glejser) 
4.1774 
[0.0020] 
4.7029 
[0.0019] 
2.4111 
[0.1112] 
1.8499 
[0.1184] 
ARCH effect test 
2.4549 
[0.1212] 
8.3428 
[0.0051] 
0.08318 
[0.7739] 
0.000453 
[0.9831] 
Heteroscedasticity test (White) 
2.3794 
[0.0080] 
3.0485 
[0.0011] 
1.45502 
[0.1121] 
1.42296 
[0.2260] 
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A first observation on the findings is that they generally indicate partial support to 
Campbell’s propositions as they were operationalized in this assessment. Specifically, 
after omitting the variables found to be insignificant, H1 is tested in all model 
formulations, H2 in Model 1, H3, H4 and H5 in Models 2 and 3. In these model 
specifications the variance in national CSR penetration ranges from an average 
explanatory power of 0.58 to the relatively high level of 0.772. Drawing from Table 2, 
H1 is supported at a 2% significance level in Model 1 and at a 10% in models 2 and 3. 
This shows that national CSR penetration is dependent on the macroeconomic 
conditions of a country. H2 is supported in all levels in Model 1 implying a very 
strong dependence between national CSR penetration and the level of market 
competition in a country. H3 is supported at all significance levels in Models 2 and 3 
entailing a very strong positive association between national CSR penetration and the 
regulatory effectiveness of a country. H4 is supported in all significance levels in 
Model 2 and at a 2% significance level in both specifications of Model 3. This 
implies another strong positive association between national CSR penetration and the 
level of self-regulation characterizing the business sector of a country. Finally, H5 is 
supported in all significance levels in Models 2 and 3 showing a very strong 
dependence between national CSR penetration and the level of civic engagement in a 
country.  
Civic engagement appears to be the most important condition affecting CSR 
penetration. This finding concerning civic engagement should not come as a surprise 
since in a large body of the ‘business in society’ literature CSR is, by definition, a 
discretionary activity stimulated and spurred by the various expectations and demands 
of organizational stakeholder groups (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1997; Lozano, 2005; 2011). 
A stronger influence on the role of macroeconomic environment and regulatory 
effectiveness on national CSR penetration was expected but according to the study’s 
model specifications they do not seem to play a critical role. Likewise, the 
insignificant impact of competitive conditions on national CSR requires further 
attention and in-depth empirical investigation.  
The study has research, managerial and policy implications given the increasing 
importance attached to the endorsement and adoption of environmental and social 
responsibility. Corporate executives need to gain a better understanding of key 
institutional determinants of the national environment that facilitate effective CSR 
implementation. This is particularly important for multinational enterprises as 
assessments such as ours can inform the diversification of their portfolio of CSR 
strategies among countries of operation, increase the awareness of cross-country 
differences caused by institutional conditions and reexamine underlying risks of 
generating CSR agendas which eventually may prove to be unsuccessful. At the same 
time, policy-making can also benefit from such evidence in developing appropriate 
regional and/or country-specific CSR endorsement plans and frameworks that take 
into account local institutional conditions as parameters that shape CSR penetration. 
Indeed, policy design for CSR cannot afford to disregard of institutional parameters 
that influence business behavior and could act as obstacles in effective agenda-setting 
for sustainable development, especially in the case of developing and transition 
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economies where institutions are redefined and evolving. Finally, research on CSR 
has so far placed comparatively less emphasis on national institutions even though 
nationality has been pinpointed as key parameter in the business ethics literature (e.g. 
O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). With more than a 100 countries worldwide not 
covered in this assessment, researchers have plenty of room to either replicate or 
challenge these results by devising more rigorous constructs to investigate national 
CSR penetration on larger samples or place their emphasis on regional trends. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
These findings, exploratory in nature, are both timely and relevant, given the 
paucity of prior empirical evidence on the topic and emphasize the call for systematic 
empirical research on national institutional mechanisms and arrangements that 
influence CSR engagement. One possible explanation of the statistical results may be 
that the study’s sample contains data only for one year; an assessment that captures 
relevant data over a time series and employs panel data analysis could challenge or 
bolster these results. Further research could not only amend the aforementioned 
limitations but also include and test additional institutional conditions set forth in 
Campbell’s framework (referring to the role of education, trade/employee associations 
and stakeholder dialogue in promoting CSR) by devising appropriate variables. 
Additionally, the variables employed in the study in order to assess the institutional 
conditions may not fully reflect Campbell’s conception and researchers may employ 
different proxies with probably better fit.  
Still, this paper demonstrates that empirical research on the institutional parameters 
influencing CSR is a field that needs further investigation with the use of both refined 
statistical techniques as well as in-depth qualitative approaches that focus on country 
groups (e.g. high-low income countries) in order to explain regional discrepancies in 
CSR penetration. Likewise, assessing through large cross country samples the 
moderating effects of informal institutions (e.g. cultural traits and religious beliefs) on 
CSR could provide a better understanding of the tensions between the nexus of 
national institutions and socially responsible business behavior. 
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 Country NCSRI 
 
 Country NCSRI 
 
 Country NCSRI 
1 Switzerland * 20,64 30 Greece  * -15,36 59 Mexico ^ -27,36 
2 Sweden * 19,50 31 Thailand ^  -17,79 60 Kazakhstan ^   -27,53 
3 Finland *  18,99 32 Romania ^ -17,98 61 Turkey ^ -27,78 
4 Denmark *   12,59 33 Malaysia  ^ -18,99 62 Costa Rica **  -27,84 
5 United Kingdom *  9,64 34 Hungary  ^ -19,50 63 Ecuador ** -28,06 
6 Netherlands *   9,27 35 Bulgaria  ^ -19,68 64 Pakistan ^ -28,10 
7 Norway *   8,04 36 India  ^ -20,64 65 Argentina ^ -28,37 
8 Australia * 6,17 37 Lithuania *   -20,87 66 Bolivia  ** -28,37 
9 Spain *   4,21 38 Slovakia  * -21,73 67 Philippines ^ -29,56 
10 France *   2,58 39 Taiwan * -22,02 68 Qatar ** -29,65 
11 Portugal *   2,30 40 Croatia  ^ -23,07 69 Belarus ^ -30,18 
12 Singapore *   0,77 41 Panama  ** -23,41 70 Tunisia  ** -30,26 
13 Japan  *  -0,25 42 Slovenia  * -23,83 71 Honduras  ** -30,43 
14 Canada -0,76 43 United Arab Emirates * -24,17 72 Kuwait **  -30,65 
15 Belgium *   -1,22 44 Serbia ** -24,26 73 Kenya **  -30,79 
16 Italy  *  -1,56 45 Sri Lanka **  -24,39 74 Egypt **  -31,45 
17 Germany   -3,93 46 Latvia * -24,81 75 Ukraine ^  -31,66 
18 Hong Kong * -5,40 47 Indonesia ^  -25,03 76 Georgia ^  -32,26 
19 Ireland *  -5,70 48 Estonia  * -25,12 77 Russian Federation ^ -32,38 
20 USA * -11,02 49 Jordan  ** -25,19 78 Oman **  -32,50 
21 Luxembourg *   -11,12 50 Bahrain  ** -25,41 79 Nigeria **  -33,13 
22 Brazil ^  -11,74 51 Viet Nam ** -25,55 80 Guatemala **   -33,51 
23 Colombia ^   -11,99 52 Mauritius  ** -26,04 81 Syrian Arab Republic**  -33,70 
24 South Korea * -12,13 53 Czech Republic *   -26,25 82 Morocco **  -33,94 
25 Austria  * -12,21 54 Iceland *  -26,36 83 Iran ** -34,00 
26 South Africa  ^ -12,58 55 Poland ^  -26,36 84 Bangladesh ^ -34,93 
27 Israel  * -13,57 56 China  ^ -26,65 85 Venezuela ^  -35,44 
28 Chile  ^ -15,13 57 Peru  ^ -26,66 86 Saudi Arabia **  -37,06 
29 New Zealand * -15,19 58 Uruguay **   -26,98  
Appendix 1: Country scores according to the national corporate responsibility index of Skouloudis (2014) and Skouloudis et al. (2016). 
Note: (*) Advanced economies, (^) Emerging economies, (**) Developing economies 
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  Europe NCSRI 
 
  Asia - Pacific NCSRI 
 
  Greater Middle East NCSRI 
1 1 Switzerland * 20,64 1 8 Australia * 6,17 1 27 Israel  * -13,57 
2 2 Sweden * 19,50 2 12 Singapore *   0,77 2 43 United Arab Emirates * -24,17 
3 3 Finland *  18,99 3 13 Japan  *  -0,25 3 49 Jordan  ** -25,19 
4 4 Denmark *   12,59 4 18 Hong Kong * -5,40 4 50 Bahrain  ** -25,41 
5 5 United Kingdom *  9,64 5 24 South Korea * -12,13 5 61 Turkey ^ -27,78 
6 6 Netherlands *   9,27 6 29 New Zealand * -15,19 6 68 Qatar ** -29,65 
7 7 Norway *   8,04 7 31 Thailand ^  -17,79 7 70 Tunisia  ** -30,26 
8 9 Spain *   4,21 8 33 Malaysia  ^ -18,99 8 72 Kuwait **  -30,65 
9 10 France *   2,58 9 36 India  ^ -20,64 9 74 Egypt **  -31,45 
10 11 Portugal *   2,30 10 39 Taiwan * -22,02 10 78 Oman **  -32,50 
11 15 Belgium *   -1,22 11 45 Sri Lanka **  -24,39 11 81 Syrian Arab Republic**  -33,70 
12 16 Italy  *  -1,56 12 47 Indonesia ^  -25,03 12 82 Morocco **  -33,94 
13 17 Germany   -3,93 13 51 Viet Nam ** -25,55 13 83 Iran ** -34,00 
14 19 Ireland *  -5,70 14 56 China  ^ -26,65 14 86 Saudi Arabia **  -37,06 
15 21 Luxembourg *   -11,12 15 64 Pakistan ^ -28,10     
16 25 Austria  * -12,21 16 67 Philippines ^ -29,56   North America NCSRI 
17 30 Greece  * -15,36 17 84 Bangladesh ^ -34,93 1 14 Canada -0,76 
18 32 Romania ^ -17,98     2 20 USA * -11,02 
19 34 Hungary  ^ -19,50   Central & South America NCSRI 3 59 Mexico ^ -27,36 
20 35 Bulgaria  ^ -19,68 1 22 Brazil ^  -11,74     
21 37 Lithuania *   -20,87 2 23 Colombia ^   -11,99  Commonwealth of Ind. States NCSRI 
22 38 Slovakia  * -21,73 3 28 Chile  ^ -15,13 1 60 Kazakhstan ^   -27,53 
23 40 Croatia  ^ -23,07 4 41 Panama  ** -23,41 2 69 Belarus ^ -30,18 
24 42 Slovenia  * -23,83 5 57 Peru  ^ -26,66 3 75 Ukraine ^  -31,66 
25 44 Serbia ** -24,26 6 58 Uruguay **   -26,98 4 76 Georgia ^  -32,26 
26 46 Latvia * -24,81 7 62 Costa Rica **  -27,84 5 77 Russian Federation ^ -32,38 
27 48 Estonia  * -25,12 8 63 Ecuador ** -28,06     
28 53 Czech Republic *   -26,25 9 65 Argentina ^ -28,37   Sub-Saharan Africa NCSRI 
29 54 Iceland *  -26,36 10 66 Bolivia  ** -28,37 1 26 South Africa  ^ -12,58 
30 55 Poland ^  -26,36  11 71 Honduras  ** -30,43  2 52 Mauritius  ** -26,04 
     12 80 Guatemala **   -33,51  3 73 Kenya **  -30,79 
     13 85 Venezuela ^  -35,44  4 79 Nigeria **  -33,13 
Appendix 2: Country groupings and national CSR scores; first two columns indicate the regional and overall rankings respectively. 
Note: Ukraine and Georgia are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States but we included them in this group due to geographical 
proximity and similarities in economic structure. 
